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Abstract
Transitive Inference (deduce B > D from B > C and C > D) can help us to understand other areas of sociocognitive development.
Across three experiments, learning, memory, and the validity of two transitive paradigms were investigated. In Experiment 1 (N =
121), 7-year-olds completed a three-term nontraining task or a five-term task requiring extensive-training. Performance was
superior on the three-term task. Experiment 2 presented 5–10-year-olds with a new five-term task, increasing learning opportu-
nities without lengthening training (N = 71). Inferences improved, suggesting children can learn five-term series rapidly.
Regarding memory, the minor (CD) premise was the best predictor of BD-inferential performance in both task-types.
However, tasks exhibited different profiles according to associations between the major (BC) premise and BD inference,
correlations between the premises, and the role of age. Experiment 3 (N = 227) helped rule out the possible objection that the
above findings simply stemmed from three-term tasks with real objects being easier to solve than computer-tasks. It also
confirmed that, unlike for five-term task (Experiments 1 & 2), inferences on three-term tasks improve with age, whether the
age range is wide (Experiment 3) or narrow (Experiment 2). I conclude that the tasks indexed different routes within a dual-
process conception of transitive reasoning: The five-term tasks indexes Type 1 (associative) processing, and the three-term task
indexes Type 2 (analytic) processing. As well as demonstrating that both tasks are perfectly valid, these findings open up
opportunities to use transitive tasks for educability, to investigate the role of transitivity in other domains of reasoning, and
potentially to benefit the lived experiences of persons with developmental issues.
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Transitive reasoning is investigated using tasks of linear syl-
logisms, dominance hierarchies, relational integration, and
learning of ordered sets (Dai, 2017; Holcomb, Stromer, &
Mackay, 1997; Ricco & Overton, 2011). When making a
transitive inference, the reasoner draws on two pieces of
information—here denoted as premise BC and premise CD
(reasons for this denotation will become clear below). The
premises must be describable in terms of a common relational
term (e.g., “nicer than”) and must overlap at a common point
(here, at itemC). From these, the reasoner actively deduces the
results of a third possible but latent comparison (here, the B?D
comparison) without needing to experience that comparison
perceptually in the real world (Bara, Bucciarelli, & Lombardo,
2010).
Transitive tasks have contributed much to developmental
psychology—for example, regarding mathematical develop-
ment, dyscalculia, fluid intelligence, hemispheric specializa-
tion, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Brunamonti
et al., 2017; Castle & Needham, 2007; De Neys &
Vanderputte, 2011; Morsanyi, Devine, Nobes & Szucs,
2013; Schwartz, Epinat-Duclos, Leone, Poisson, & Prado,
2020; van Duyne & Sass, 1979). Given the well-accepted
applications of transitive tasks for so many purposes, it is
surprising to note that one of the most fundamental debates,
concerning transitive tasks, has not yet been resolved. This
debate, perhaps best captured by Bryant (1998), concerns
the relative validity of two alternative ways of assessing tran-
sitive reasoning. In brief, one way is to use five-term tasks and
another is to use three-term tasks; although, as will become
clear below, the differences go well beyond the variation in
number of items.
Three-term tasks contain the most basic linear syllogistic
structure: Provide B > C and C > D; infer B > D (Morsanyi
et al., 2013; cf. Sternberg, 1980; Wright, Robertson, &
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Hadfield, 2011). Using these, Piaget and Inhelder (1956/1967)
reported that children develop transitive competencies from
around 7 or 8 years of age (see also Ameel, Verschueren, &
Schaeken, 2007; Dai, 2017; Markovits, & Dumas, 1999;
Verweij, Sijtsma, & Koops, 1996). However, Bryant (1998)
raised three key issues against these tasks. First, three-term
tasks were claimed as inherently unable to assess deduction,
whereas other transitive tasks (see below) routinely index de-
duction. Of note, Bryant’s lab used three-term tasks (e.g.,
Bryant & Kopytynska, 1976) or extrapolations of three-term
subseries from larger series (e.g., Pears & Bryant, 1990). This
implies acceptance that in certain circumstances, three-term
tasks can test the target transitive competence (Bara et al.,
2010; cf. Stevens, 1951).
Second, using only three terms creates the risk that children
will routinely use the unique label given to the largest item
rather than any kind of inference, logical or not, to reach the
transitive inference (e.g., parroting/categorical labelling;
Wright, 2001). Therefore, three-term tasks, by virtue of hav-
ing only three terms, can never validly index transitive infer-
ence (Bryant, 1998). Yet no theorist espousing that view sup-
ports it with direct empirical evidence. In the absence of such
evidence, it is scientifically prudent to remain open to the
alternative view that there might be many ways of generating
transitive responses (Ameel et al., 2007; MacLean, Merritt, &
Brannon, 2008; Piaget, Grize, Szeminska, & Vinh Bang,
1968/1977; Premack, 2007).
Third, children may fail three-term tasks because of poor
memory rather than because of not possessing the logical ca-
pacity needed for transitive inference. We can address this
potential issue by ensuring that the child remembers the pre-
mise information before going ahead with testing for the infer-
ential response. However, although Bryant’s lab identified this
potential shortcoming, they never modified the three-term task
to deal with it (e.g., it was not applied in Bryant &
Kopytynska’s, 1976, use of the standard three-term task).
Rather than modify three-term tasks to avoid the above issues,
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) popularized a task based around
five or more terms, employing repeated training on a minimum
of four premises (Amd&Roche, 2016; Berens&Hayes, 2007;
Holcomb et al., 1997; Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013; Titone,
Ditman, Holzman, Eichenbaum, & Levy, 2004).
Several issues arise regarding five-term tasks. The first is
about which item-pair is equivalent to the critical pair in the
three-term task. One can understand this by starting with the
denotation of the three-term task as A > B plus B > C leads to
A > C. In the five-term task there are two additional premise
pairs, C > D and D > E. So, on the surface it might look as
though the equivalent critical comparison on the five-term
task is either B versus D or A versus E. This causes little
ambiguity in research relying only on one task type or the
other. But if both task types need to be directly compared,
the old denotation can easily cause confusion. In that event,
the most prudent thing to do is to give the pairs that are to be
compared equivalent names across the two paradigms. The
most straightforward way of achieving this equivalence is to
relabel the items in the three-term task as B, C, and D.
The second issue is about comparability of what each task
theoretically measures. Whilst the five-term task avoided end
items being used as an index of deduction, it introduced a new
problem as serious as the one it claimed to solve. Namely, it
replaced two premise pairs (BC & CD) and one inference (BD)
on the three-term task, with at least four premise pairs (AB, BC,
CD, & DE) plus six inferential pairs (AC, BD, CE, AD, BE, &
AE). Five-term tasks increased the memory load at least two-
fold and increased the inferential load at least six-fold. The
overall number of paired relationships increased from three
pairs on a three-term task to 10 on a five-term task, and for a
six-term task it would be an even higher 15 pairs. However,
although transitivity of three-term sets can be considered a mat-
ter of logic (Bara et al., 2010; Piaget et al., 1968/1977; Stevens,
1951), no theorist offered a logical or mathematical basis for
expecting that a five-term task should index the same capacity,
the same level of difficulty or the same memory load as does a
three-term task. That said, as the Bryant and Trabasso (1971)
claimwaswidely accepted in the developmental, adult, learning
difficulties, and comparative psychological literature (Gazes,
Lazareva, Bergene, & Hampton, 2014; Holcomb et al., 1997;
Stromer, Mackay, Cohen, & Stoddard, 1993), this claim was
tested in the present research.
Third, whereas one might need to present premises on a
three-term task only once each (Wright & Dowker, 2002), on
the five-term task this results in lack of learning the premises
(Wright, 2001). Therefore, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) intro-
duced “extensive training” (Yamazaki, 2004). This ensured that
premises were learned, and only after this training would par-
ticipants move to an inference-testing phase (Brunamonti et al.,
2017; Kumaran&Ludwig, 2013; Qu, van der Henst, &Dreher,
2017). However, even in some studies with typically developed
adults, only 60% of reasoners pass the task after highly exten-
sive training to a criterion of 100% (e.g., Amd&Roche, 2016).
This situation contrasts against Stromer et al. (1993), who
trained a typically developing 5-year-old child and two adults
with mental ages similar to the child participant on two totally
independent five-term transitive tasks. When participants were
asked to compare B from one task versus D from the other task,
B was chosen 100% of the time. This is a systematic strategy,
but clearly not a logical one (Wright, 2001). This raises the
important question of what bearing amount of training has on
the nature of our mental processes, when using the extensive-
training paradigm (Amd & Roche, 2016; Wright, 2006a).
Fourth, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) claimed that “all
groups learned the initial (direct) comparisons rapidly” (p.
457). This leads us to assume that their criterion level for
premise training (90% correct responses) was reached in a
single session.With this training, children down to age 4 years
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did rather well (i.e., at least 78% correct) on the critical BD
inference. However, this situation contrasts with Riley and
Trabasso (1974), who needed to spend 5 days on training
children and so concluded it might not be possible to train
children using rapid learning (see also Berens & Hayes,
2007; Gazes et al., 2014; Holcomb et al., 1997; Trabasso,
van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). This issue is important to settle.
For instance, it might be considered unethical to remove chil-
dren for more than half an hour’s transitive training in school,
as they might be missing out on that day’s teaching in an
important subject (Brunamonti et al., 2017; Castle &
Needham, 2007; Long & Kamii, 2001; Morsanyi et al.,
2013; Rabinowitz, Grant, Howe, & Walsh, 1994).
There are also issues that affect both tasks, such as about
relationships between reasoning and memory. Earlier, memo-
ry of the premises was intimated to be crucial in generating
inferences (Chapman & Lindenberger, 1992). Indeed, several
investigators used the product of BC and CD, as a predictor
for the BD inference (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Wright,
2006a; Wright & Howells, 2008). This contrasts with other
studies that have reported the statistical independence of
memory for the premises and deducing the inferential com-
parison (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). It may be that memory
dependence exists on one type of task, but memory indepen-
dence on the other.
As another issue, it is assumed that series acquisition pro-
ceeds from the unmarked end of the series (e.g., larger end;
Titone et al., 2004; Wright, 2006a). This predicts that of the
two pairs logically required to make the BD inference, BC
should be remembered better than CD, and the difference
between BC and CD should favour the BC pair. In Bryant
and Trabasso (1971) data summary for 4–6-year-olds
(Experiment 1), the opposite profile was observed for two of
their three groups, with only the 4-year-olds showing a BC
advantage (see also Wright & Smailes, 2015). This raises the
question of whether there is a CD superiority effect.
A final issue is which of the antecedent premises, if any,
drives the BD inferential response. Brainerd and Reyna (1992)
report that after highly extended training, the “gist” of the
transitive series is represented in memory from the larger
end to the smaller end; it follows that in the case of BC, CD,
and BD, the larger of the premise pairs should be more closely
associated with the BD inference. However, few if any of
these important memory issues were explicitly drawn out of
the relevant papers. Clearly, the role of memory in transitive
responding needs further investigation both with extensive-
training tasks and three-term tasks.
Summary of aims
Using three studies containing different task variants, the first
of four main aims was to provide the first direct comparison
between extensive-training tasks and three-term tasks. The
second aim was to satisfy issues levelled against either the
extensive-training task or the three-term task. These include
whether categorical effects lead to performance at ceiling, plus
the testing of premise memory after the giving of transitive
responses. The third aim was to assess additional memory
issues, such as whether levels of premise retention and the
relationship between premise memory and the inferential re-
sponse vary with age or across three-term versus extensive-
training tasks. The fourth aim was to determine whether it is
possible to teach children the premises on a five-term exten-
sive-training task relatively rapidly. I operationalized “rapid-
ly” according to Riley and Trabasso (1974), as needing to
remove a child from no more than a single 25–30-minute
primary-school lesson such that children both remember the
premises well and potentially do well in giving transitive
responses.
As one point of agreement between extensive-training ad-
vocates and three-term advocates is that children are compe-
tent in deductive transitive reasoning by or before they are 7–
8-years-old, the present tasks were restricted to groups of
mean age 4 to 8 years.
Experiment 1
Method for Experiment 1
Participants
A total of 121 children participated (M = 7.6 years, SD =
0.315). There was roughly an equal split of girls and boys in
each group. All children were typically developing, with
English as their first or only language. Children were allocated
to a three-term nontraining task or a five-term extensive-train-
ing task (see below for task details). This resulted in 77 chil-
dren of 7.1 to 7.9 years, assigned to the three-term nontraining
task (M = 7.5 years, SD = 0.180), and 44 children of 7.4 to 8.6
years assigned to the five-term extensive-training task (M =
7.9 years, SD = 0.327). The variation in sample size for the
two respective tasks was due to the nontraining task taking
less time to complete than the extensive-training task. Given
the quite reasonable constraints on total time allowed by
schools, this meant fewer children could be tested on the latter
task.
Materials
The classical transitive inference task is the three-term task
and such tasks can be learnt with as few as one presentation
of the premises (Wright & Dowker, 2002). By contrast, five-
term tasks typically require highly repeated training on the
same premises repeatedly (Wright, 2006a). According to
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Wright (2001), repeatedly training participants on the same
three-term task would lead to direct recollection of the BD
inference, rather than this pair being resolved via any kind of
reasoning. Therefore, to begin to make the two types of task as
equivalent as possible and also to permit the collection of
enough BD responses so as to allow parametric statistical
analyses, a different three-term series needed to be used, to
correspond to each successive round of training and test on the
five-term task (four tasks/sessions in each case, excluding
practice/familiarization trials).
The materials for the three-term task were based onWright
and Dowker (2002). These were three-dimensional rod-like
objects that were either circular or square in cross-sectional
area. There were two versions of each shape, based on increas-
ing cross-sectional area (width/diameter = 2cm vs. 4cm). Each
of the four sets comprised one item of each of the following
colours: red, blue, green, yellow, and white. A three-term
series was constructed by selecting three items within a given
set.
Octagonal cards painted with each of these colours were
also used (width/diameter = 3 cm). In this task, randomized
assignments of object to serial order position were used, but
once assigned, the ordinal position for each object was fixed.
The extensive-training task used a PC compatible laptop
computer with a 17-inch screen. This was a computer-
presented version of the Bryant and Trabasso (1971) task. It
used the relational dimension of “length”, equivalent to that
used in the three-term task. Colours used were the same as the
three-term task. To mimic the discrete objects in the three-
term task, which each had their own colour and length, once
a given mapping of colour onto order had been introduced for
a given participant, that mapping was retained for the remain-
der of the task. A separate dedicated external USB numeric
keypad was used to collect responses. White ring reinforcers
(which looked like a Polo Mint) were stuck onto the centre of
the “4” key and the “6” key, so the child knew which keys to
choose from in the experiment.
Design
The basic design was between subjects, with the 7-year-olds
doing one of the two tasks (three-term task vs. five-term task).
Procedure
For this and the other experiments reported here, ethical ap-
proval and parental consent were gained prior to testing.
Testing took place in a quiet but familiar room within the
school. The two tasks make use of seemingly incompatible
methodologies (Bryant, 1998), and so the aim here was to
make them as similar to each other as possible, via their pro-
cedural regimes. Here, both tasks used a practice/
familiarization stage, with transitive series different to those
used in the tasks proper, followed by discussion not connected
with the task, and ending with the task proper.
The procedure for the three-term task began with the child
being shown one example of each of the possible shapes and
sizes, using four different colours overall. After this familiar-
ization, a practice trial was given. Here, the experimenter held
up two objects (e.g., B & C) at a time, about 1.5 m apart. The
child indicated which one was longer. The items were now
removed from view, and the next item pair (e.g., C with D)
was shown in the same way. Next, with all three items now
out of view, the child recapped the two pairs of items that had
been shown, by reporting their colours and which one had
been the longer of each pair. All children reported the item
shapes, respective colours, and the size relationships correctly.
The inferential question was asked via a two-alternative
forced-choice format using octagonal colour cards. Holding
up two cards in random order, I asked, “So if I showed you the
object that was this colour and the object that was this colour,
which one do you think would be the longer of those two?”
Finally, after the child gave an inferential response, memory
for the premises was rechecked by using the octagonal cards.
A difference between practice and proper trials was that in
the practice trial, the child was encouraged to ask the experi-
menter if he or she was unsure about any aspect of the proce-
dure and was encouraged to explain his or her thinking
(Verweij et al., 1996). Also, in the practice trial, the child
was given feedback about whether the premises had been
correctly retained in each of the memory phases (before and
after the inferential response).
Following the practice/familiarization stage, the child was
engaged in a brief discussion for around 2 minutes, to reduce
the risk of the practice trial interfering with the task proper
(proactive interference). Next, four proper trials were given,
using the above learning, test, and memory phases. Each used
a different one of the four compositions of item cross-sectional
shape (circular or square) and item width/diameter (2 cm or 4
cm).
On the test questions of the proper trials, no feedback was
given regarding the correctness of the inference or of the
memory pairs. In this way, I adequately addressed an issue
raised about memory by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) and
Bryant (1998), in so far as poor memory during premise ac-
quisition cannot be blamed for subsequent inferential perfor-
mance. This also meant that, perhaps for the first time, it was
possible to determine whether memory performance remains
at 100% after the child has answered the inferential question.
The four trials were ordered randomly. Each child received
one mark for each correct answer to test/memory questions,
meaning the maximum possible score across BC trials was 4,
and likewise for CD and for the BD inference trials. Including
briefing, debriefing, practice trial, brief discussion, and proper
trials, the three-term procedure took around 15 minutes to
administer.
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The extensive-training task used two practice/
familiarization trials on a single series. These each necessarily
contained four premise pairs because the implied series had
five items in all. Practice was followed by a discussion as
before. The proper trials were then given. Proper trials fixed
the amount of training at five introductions to the four pre-
mises (training increments), to render this task as comparable
as possible with the three-term task whilst giving children the
opportunity to learn the premises well (Bryant & Trabasso,
1971). Note, the first learning-test increment was discounted,
as during it the child was not yet used to the specific premise
or test pairs constituting the transitive series (which was dif-
ferent from the series used for practice).
Before beginning the task proper, a shortened version of it,
having only two increments, was used to familiarize the child
with the task context and responses required. This meant the
child experienced one serial presentation and one random pre-
sentation of the premise pairs. This practice was followed by a
short discussion of the child’s day to reduce the chance of
proactive interference with the following proper task, and then
the proper task was given. The practice stage provided a test
phase after the serial presentation of the premises, but did not
present a test phase after the randomized premises; this was
only done in the task proper. However, the first learning-test
increment proper served to further familiarise children with
the format of the test phases.
Children were instructed verbally about the task and shown
how to use the numeric keypad to tell the computer their
answers. They sat approximately 60 cm from the screen. In
any learning phase, each of the four premises was shown once.
Two sticks comprising a premise were gradually revealed
from behind a pair of curtains opening upwards and down-
wards from the middle. The curtains stopped before revealing
the entirety of either stick. One stick was to the left of the
centre of the screen and the other was to the right. Their posi-
tion was randomly determined. Once the curtains were sta-
tionary, children were asked to press a designated key to in-
dicate the stick they thought was longer. They used the sepa-
rate numeric keypad to tell the computer this. If children
thought the longer stick was on the left of the screen, they
pressed the “4” key. If it was on the right, they pressed the
“6” key.
Feedback was threefold. The curtains opened further to
reveal the full length of each stick so that the child could see
whether his or her response had been correct. Simultaneous
with this feedback, a high-pitched or low-pitched tone indi-
cated a correct versus incorrect response, and the word
“Correct” or “Wrong” was displayed in large text at the bot-
tom of the screen. After a break of up to 3 seconds, the next
premise pair was presented in the same way.
Each pair was on screen for as long as required and con-
trolled by participant key presses, which would result in the
curtains opening (as described above). The first presentation
of the four premises always came in ascending or descending
order (Riley & Trabasso, 1974). This direction (ascending vs.
descending) was generated randomly by the computer pro-
gram (Wright, 2006a). Following Moses and Ostreicher
(2010), the subsequent four increments each used a newly
randomized premise presentation order.
In the task proper, every learning phase was followed by a
test phase. In the test phase, each of the four premises was
presented along with the six possible inferential pairs.
However, no feedback was given: The curtains stopped open-
ing just before they would have revealed the tops and bottoms
of the sticks, and no tonal or text feedback was provided.
Thus, here, just as with the three-term task, the child was not
given feedback about whether a particular decision had been
correct or not.
The test increment tested each of the four premises and the
six possible inferential pair-wise comparisons a total of four
times, to give a total of 40 test trials. The only nonrandom
criterion was that all 10 pairs were tested exactly once, before
any of them could be tested again. But within each round of
testing the order of asking the memory and inferential ques-
tions was randomized anew (following Riley & Trabasso,
1974). This gave a maximum possible score of 4 for each
respective premise pair and each respective inferential pair,
just as for the three-term task.
The data comparable with the three-term task were drawn
from only the final test increment; the purpose of the prior
learning-test phases was to improve the child’s premise per-
formance as much as possible, given the very reasonable time
constraints of the school. From this increment I focused only
on the pairs critical to the fairest but most valid test of transi-
tive reasoning capacity (i.e., BC, CD, and the BD inference;
see Bryant, 1998; Wright, 2006a). For this task, briefing,
debriefing, practice/familiarization, brief discussion, and
proper task took around 27 minutes per child.
Results and discussion for Experiment 1
The critical BCD data of interest were analyzed using para-
metric tests with an alpha level of 0.05. The inferential (BD)
data are presented in Table 1, both as values out of 4 and as
percentages to allow direct comparison against previous stud-
ies. Table 1 shows that BD performance was relatively good,
both on the three-term task and the five-term extensive-train-
ing task. However, on the three-term task, performance was
47.9% higher relative to the five-term task (see Table 1 for
absolute values).
The overall difference in BD performance between the two
tasks was assessed using a one-way analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA). Task was the between-subjects factor, having
two levels corresponding to the three-term task versus the
extensive-training task. Children’s exact ages (in years, to 3
decimal places) and their memory scores were entered as the
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covariates, to allow assessment of task performance control-
ling as much as possible for small variations in age and mem-
ory (seeMoses & Ostreicher, 2010, for similar use of memory
scores). The analysis confirmed that the high inferential per-
formance on the three-term task compared with the five-term
task was statistically significant, F(1, 117) = 9.585, p = .004.
Age was not a statistically significant covariate, F(1, 117) < 1,
which was unsurprising given that children had been deliber-
ately selected mainly within a single school year. However,
memory was a significant covariate, F(1, 117) = 5.084, p =
.001, and this is considered further later on.
The findings for inferential performance on the extensive-
training task are not perplexing if taken in the context of find-
ings from a recent task with adults. Moses and Ostreicher
(2010) reported that older adults (i.e., over 60 years old)
who are not made explicitly aware of the linear ordering of
items (e.g., Item A to Item E) also perform near 50%. It may
simply be, then, that here the 7-year-olds given the extensive-
training task did not explicitly appreciate the fully transitive
nature of the five-term series. For the three-term task, the level
found here is consistent with that of Ameel et al. (2007) in a
spatial three-term transitive task (they reported 74% at age 8.3
years).
Turning to memory, Table 1 summarizes memory for each
of the two premises in turn (BC & CD) as well as the mean of
these (constituting the memory covariate in the previous anal-
ysis). It shows a tendency for memory in the three-term task to
be much better than memory in the extensive-training task.
Memory performance was assessed using a two-way mixed-
model ANCOVA. The between-subjects factor was task. The
second factor was premise, which was the repeated factor,
with two levels corresponding to the logical antecedents for
the BD inference (i.e., the major premise BC and the minor
premise CD). As before, age was entered as a covariate as a
precaution. In this analysis, age was not statistically signifi-
cant as a covariate, F(1, 118) < 1. This confirms that memory
did not reliably improve with age, across a single school year.
Of main interest, though, the main effect of task was statis-
tically significant, F(1, 118) = 58.795, p < .001, confirming
that the extensive-training task did not lead to as high memory
as the three-term task. However, the main effect of premise
was not statistically significant, F(1, 118) < 1. Any tendency
toward a two-way interaction between task and premise did
not approach statistical significance, F(2, 118) < 1.
Experiment 2
An interpretation of Experiment 1, is that extensive-training
tasks are more difficult to learn and solve than are three-term
tasks. According to Wright (2006a), this is partly because the
retention of four interlinked premises places greater memory
load on the reasoner than does the retention of only two
interlinked premises (Perner & Mansbridge, 1983).
However, to answer why this is, it is prudent to look for spe-
cific factors that might underlie the difference in difficulty.
One possibility is that the use of five increments of training
for the five-term task, with testing after each increment, fa-
tigued the young participants by the time they got to the final
test increment (increment 5). Hence, compared with the three-
term task, this group achieved less good premise retention by
the end of testing.
One solution is to reduce the number of increments, whilst
maintaining or increasing the number of opportunities for each
child to see the premises. This could be done by spending 4 or
5 days training children in blocks lasting 15–30 minutes
Table 1 Memory and inferential performance for three tasks across Experiments 1 and 2
Premise pairs (Memory) Inference
BC CD Both BD
Experiment 1
5 term 2.311 (0.129)
58%
2.211 (0.128)
55%
2.261 (0.079)
57%
2.249 (0.171)
56%
3-term 3.321 (0.099)
83%
3.498 (0.098)
87%
3.409 (0.061)
85%
3.052 (0.139)
76%
Both tasks 2.839 (0.077)
71%
2.844 (0.076)
71%
2.841 (0.056)
71%
2.702 (0.097)
65%
Experiment 2
5 term 2.593 (0.102)
65%
2.618 (0.101)
65%
2.605 (0.063)
65%
2.472 (0.123)
62%
All 3 tasks 2.742 (0.064)
69%
2.776 (0.063)
69%
2.759 (0.039)
69%
2.591 (0.075)
65%
Note. Memory and inference scores are given after controlling for age. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of mean scores. Percentages are
included for ease of comparison with other research
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(Holcomb et al., 1997; cf. Riley & Trabasso, 1974). But in the
current UK educational context, it is less feasible to remove a
child from class for longer than one lesson period. What need-
ed to be done then, was to somehow reduce testing, but in-
crease training, all whilst remaining within the time limits
afforded by today’s UK schools.
The second experiment addressed these issues via a new
computer-based five-term extensive-training task. The aim
was to give children the greatest chance of showing their tran-
sitive abilities, by removing every reasonable barrier.
Crucially, as compared with the extensive-training task used
in Experiment 1, twice the premise presentations were
employed before a test session, whilst keeping overall test
time as close as possible to that of the extensive-training task
of Experiment 1. This was achieved by doubling the number
of presentations in the learning phases whilst reducing the
number of rounds of testing.
As well as the above two issues, which can be considered
variables, there were two other issues that can be considered
cohort issues. One is the possible reason that the relatively low
inferential performance on the five-term task in Experiment 1
stemmed from that experiment being as inclusive as possible.
Kallio (1982) found that about one-third of children tested fail
pretests (essentially, tests of premise learning prior to the tran-
sitive tasks proper). Kallio noted that this exclusion practice
features in much transitive research. It continues more recently,
too (e.g., Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, & Dymond, 2006). In re-
moving those children whowould fail the task, themean for the
remaining group would likely be raised. Therefore, the nonuse
of exclusion criteria in Experiment 1 might partly lay behind
children’s relatively low performance in its five-term task.
The second cohort-based issue is that Experiment 1 ensured
that children were all of similar age (range around 1.2 years for
tasks combined). This contrasts with Bryant and Trabasso
(1971), who ensured an age range of approximately 4 years
(4 to 7 years) and reported that performance increased with
age (4 years = 78%, 5 years = 84%, 6 years = 88%). It is
therefore possible that including a much larger age range com-
pared with Experiment 1 might now result in increases in per-
formance with age. Also, as I would expect the under 7s to
approach chance performance (50%), but the over 7s to ap-
proach perfect performance (100%), this should raise the over-
all level of performance for the group as a whole towards 75%.
Lastly, by comparing this new five-term extensive-training
task to that of Experiment 1, it was possible to comment on the
role of unrestricted training to previous findings with 4-year-olds.
Method for Experiment 2
Participants
A total of 97 children, 5.28 to 10.00 years of age took part
(M = 7.80 years, SD = 1.062). Children whose mean premise
memory for the critical antecedents (BC & CD) and for the
mean of the two nonantecedents (AB & DE) was not greater
than chance were excluded from the analyses. These criteria
led to a reduced sample of 71 children of 5.30 to 10.00 years
who were included in the analyses. This sample size was very
close to that of the three-term task of Experiment 1. Here,
children’s mean age was 7.90 years (SD = 1.234), and there
was an approximately equal number of boys and girls, all
children having English as their first language.
Materials
These were similar to the five-term task of Experiment 1. The
presentation regime (e.g., viewing distance) and stimuli within
the new five-term extensive-training task (e.g., sizes, colours,
presentation times) were similar to those of the five-term task
from Experiment 1. The main departures are explained in the
procedure section below. As before, a laptop PC with a 17-
inch screen and an external numeric keypad were used.
Design
The basic design was identical to the five-term task of
Experiment 1.
Procedure
This was the same as the five-term task of Experiment 1,
notwithstanding the computer program being new. This in-
cluded the provision of learning trials followed by a single test
phase, as practice/familiarization trials, similar to Experiment
1. To reduce the possibility of distracting children, the need to
use computer-generated curtains during learning or test trials,
was dispensed with. Instead, children saw the full-length rep-
resentations of items during the learning phases (explained as
a side view of objects), but during test phases they saw only
the tops of items (view from directly above which showed
circular cross-sections of objects only, but no length
information).
Next, to reduce the possibility that the use of five incre-
ments of testing in Experiment 1 had exhausted the young
participants, children were tested only twice in the present
experiment. However, after one initial presentation of each
premise pair, they were presented with each premise a total
of four times within each of the two learning phases, making
for eight repetitions of each premise pair in total; twice the
presentations of Experiment 1.
The first learning phase showed a premise once for 5 to 6
seconds (randomly determined), followed by a 1 to 2 second
blank screenwith fixation cross, followed by the next premise.
Participants were instructed to carefully watch the presenta-
tion and remember which item was longer of each premise
pair, but they were not required to respond to these trials.
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Premises were presented in random order, with one item of
each premise pair on the left and the other on the right as in
Experiment 1. Once all four premises had been presented
once, their order was rerandomized, and then each one was
presented again. Upon four presentation routines being
shown, the first learning phase was complete.
A test phase followed, similar to that used in Experiment 1,
except that each test trial now was presented eight times in-
stead of four times for a more fine-grained assessment of pre-
mise learning and inferential performance. Each test trial
showed a circle of each of the two colours of the items that
had been seen as sticks in the learning phase. The children
were told that the circles were the ends of the sticks as viewed
from above. In this way, children saw a representation of each
stick, but not the lengths of those sticks. Responses were given
as in Experiment 1.
After the first test phase was complete, the child began the
second learning phase, followed by a second test phase. Only
the data from the second test phase were used. The average
total time including briefing, testing, and debriefing, was 30
minutes.
Results and discussion for Experiment 2
For the present task, each correct answer received half a mark,
making the maximum possible score 4, as in Experiment 1.
The bottom section of Table 1 summarizes children’s inferen-
tial and memory performance on the new five-term task
against both the three-term and five-term tasks of
Experiment 1. Regarding inferential performance, the last col-
umn shows that the five-term extensive-training task of
Experiment 2 led to higher performance compared with the
five-term extensive-training task of Experiment 1. However, it
did not lead to inferential performance on the five-term exten-
sive-training task of Experiment 2 rivalling that on the three-
term task.
These tendencies were assessed using a one-way
ANCOVAwith the three tasks entered as levels of the variable
“task”, and age and mean memory as covariates. For task, age
was not a statistically significant covariate, F(1, 187) < 1.
However, mean memory was a significant covariate, F(1,
187) = 11.072, p = .001.
With age controlled, the overall difference in inferential
performance on the three tasks was statistically significant,
F(2, 187) = 5.782, p = .004. Contrast analyses confirmed that
the tendency for higher inferential performance on the five-
term task with fewer test increments (Experiment 2), com-
pared with on the five-term task with more test increments
(Experiment 1), was statistically significant (p = .050).
Importantly, the three-term task resulted in significantly better
inferential performance than both the five-term task with less
premise exposure or the task with twice the premise exposure
(p = .001, p = .004, respectively).
Turning to memory, a separate two-way ANCOVA with
the three tasks as levels of the between-subjects factor and the
two premises as levels of the within-subjects factor confirmed
a statistically significant overall difference in memory for the
three respective tasks, F(2, 188) = 74.985, p < .001. As found
for inference, contrast analyses showed that memory for the
five-term task of Experiment 2 was significantly better than
for the similar task of Experiment 1 (p = .001). However,
memory for either of these tasks did not significantly rival
memory for the three-term task of Experiment 1 (five-term
task with fewer premise exposures, p < .001; five-term task
with twice the exposures to premises, p < .001).
As had been the case with inferential performance, age was
not a statistically significant covariate ofmemory performance
on the three tasks taken together, F(1, 188) < 1. However,
interestingly age was a statistically significant covariate of
the difference between premise BC and CD, F(1, 188) =
12.673, p < .001. Additionally, controlling for age in this
way, there was still a statistically significant difference be-
tween premise BC and CD, F(1, 188) = 12.208, p = .001.
This indicated that overall, premise CD yielded reliably better
performance than BC (see Table 1, which shows premise
memory after controlling for age).
The ANCOVA revealed no statistically significant two-
way interaction between task and individual premise reten-
tion, F(2, 188) < 1. From this one can infer that, although
overall (i.e., mean) premise memory did differ from one task
to another, the average of the BC premise and the CD premise
did not reliably alter between tasks.
Thus far, the analyses have confirmed that doubling the
amount of exposure to premises without increasing the time
taken to train children results both in better memory and in
better inferential performance. This is in line with the com-
monly held view that inference is always a direct by-product
of premise memory (Chapman & Lindenberger, 1992;
Trabasso, 1977).
Correlational and regression analyses tested the view that the
major (BC) premise plays a stronger role in acquisition of the
inference than the minor (CD) premise. For correlations, there
were two ways of testing whether the BD inference is a direct
by-product of premise memory. The first was to consider BD
against each premise in turn. The second was the method used
in Bryant and Trabasso (1971) of computing the product of BC
and CD (i.e., BC × CD) and assessing its relationship to BD.
Both methods were used in the correlational analyses. Next,
observe that the difference between BC and CD covaried with
children’s age. Therefore, the premise-difference score was
computed to assess its correlation both with age and other var-
iables (most notably the BD inference). The direction of this
difference additionally allowed the testing of the assumption
that the major BC premise takes the lead in reaching the BD
inference (Bryant, 1998). As the five-term task of Experiment 1
had resulted in lowest mean premise memory and inferential
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performance (the latter was only 6% above chance perfor-
mance), that task was not analyzed further.
The pair-wise correlations between the variables outlined
here, for the three-term task and for the five-term task of
Experiment 2, are presented in Table 2. Correlations of the
three-term task are summarized in the top-right triangle of the
table, with the five-term task summarized in the bottom-left tri-
angle. For the three-term task, inferential BD performance sig-
nificantly increased with children’s age. This is more interesting
given the narrower age group of the children who completed this
task. Table 2 shows that memory for the minor CD premise
memory was significantly correlated with BD performance, but
although the major BC premise was positively associated with
BD, that correlation was not statistically significant. Both the
premise-product and the premise-difference-score were signifi-
cantly correlated to BD. The correlation regarding premise-
difference-score was negative, indicating that smaller differences
between the premises (e.g., when the child remembered both
premises) were associated with higher BD performance.
Finally, for the three-term task, it was interesting to note that
premise retention for BC was not significantly associated with
CD. This suggests that the BD inference did not derive passively
from the automatic integration of the premises.
The correlations regarding the five-term task of Experiment
2 contained two salient departures from that for the three-term
task. The first departure was that now age did not correlate
with BD performance. This finding is quite intriguing given
that children were tested across a much wider age range for
this task, which had been intended to maximize the likelihood
that older ages were associated with higher BD performance.
The second departure was that, whereas there was no associ-
ation between memory for the major BC premise and the BD
inference for the three-term task, for the five-term task there
was a correlation, but it was in the opposite direction to the
tendency for the three-term task (i.e., it was now negative).
This indicates that it was children who remembered BC less
well who tended to do better on the BD inference.
Concerning the sizes of correlations of BC and CD with
BD, one should note that the correlation regarding CD was
more than twice the magnitude of that regarding BC. Thus,
CD tends to play the greater role in the BD inference. Unlike
the three-term task where BC and CD were uncorrelated, for
the five-term task there was a strong negative correlation be-
tween BC and CD. This indicates that children remembering
one premise tended to have difficulty retaining the other
premise.
Following the two correlational analyses, separate linear-
regression analyses were conducted for the three-term task
and five-term task. In each regression, inferential performance
was entered as the criterion (dependent) variable and the two
premises (BC & CD), plus age were predictors (independent)
variables. Also included were the two additional variables—
premise product and premise-difference-scores—as these had
produced significant correlations with BD earlier (see
Table 2). I opted for a step-wise hierarchical regression model
to allow the statistical package (SPSS Version 24; IBM
Corporation) to settle on the minimum number of variables
explaining BD performance with the highest statistical
reliability.
A summary of the respective regression models is given in
Table 3. For the three-term task, SPSS offered two models.
The final model was statistically significant and accounted for
26.7% of the variance in the inference data (R = .517). This
model contained the CD premise and age, with each having a
positive standardized beta coefficient. However, the BC pre-
mise, premise-product, and the premise-difference score were
each excluded from the final model (see Table 3).
In the analogous regression for the five-term task, the mod-
el was again statistically significant, accounting for 23.7% of
the variance in the inference data (R = .487). SPSS offered
only one model, and this contained only the CD premise. All
other variables were excluded from the model.
Experiment 3
The two previous experiments taken together confirmed that it
is possible to obtain increased transitive performance by
Table 2 Summary of bivariate correlations for two tasks in Experiment 2
BD Ages BC CD Predict_i Prem_Diff
BD – 0.322 (0.002) 0.108 (0.176) 0.448 (0.001) 0.367 (0.001) −0.242 (0.017)
Ages −0.001 (0.498) – 0.113 (0.165) 0.152 (0.094) 0.200 (0.040) −0.027 (0.408)
BC −0.221 (0.032) −0.278 (0.009) – 0.029 (0.402) 0.742 (0.001) 0.702 (0.001)
CD 0.487 (0.001) 0.299 (0.006) −0.668 (0.001) – 0.681 (0.001) −0.692 (0.001)
Predict_i 0.281 (0.009) −0.077 (0.262) 0.400 (0.001) 0.373 (0.001) – 0.050 (0.334)
Prem_Diff −0.388 (0.001) −0.316 (0.004) 0.914 (0.001) −0.913 (0.001) 0.016 (0.448) –
Note. Top-right triangle summarises three-term task. Bottom left triangle summarises extensive-training task of Experiment 2. Figures in parentheses are
levels of statistical significance. Predict_i = use product of BC & CD to predict BD; Prem_Diff = compute difference between BC & CD
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modifying a five-term task (Wright & Howells, 2008). It also
confirmed some important differences between performance
profiles on three-term versus five-term tasks.
One could object to these findings on two methodo-
logical grounds. First, the three-term task used physical-
ly present objects to imply the transitive series, whereas
the five-term task presented items on computer instead
of being real (physically present) objects. Thus, perhaps
performance and profile differences between three-term
and five-term tasks reported above were due to fewer
cognitive demands associated with physical tasks versus
computer-presented tasks, and not to genuine differences
in transitive reasoning (my thanks to one anonymous
reviewer for this observation).
A second possible objection is that in the three-term task
used thus far, premise memory was assessed by using octag-
onal tokens to stand for the actual objects. However, in both
five-term tasks, children saw the actual items both for memory
and for inferential trials. Hence, the difference between tasks
could have been due to the use of physical tokens in one task
but not the other, instead of genuine differences. It should be
noted that the use of tokens in the three-term task meant that,
in addition to reasoning about the actual items in the series, the
children had to mentally map the visible tokens onto represen-
tations of the objects held in memory (Wright & Dowker,
2002). If anything, this additional requirement should be ex-
pected to render the three-term task more difficult, but in
Experiments 1 and 2, the three-term task led to higher, not
lower performance than each five-term task (Wright, 2012).
The implication is that the use of a noncomputer presentation
was greater than the challenges due to the use of tokens on the
above three-term task.
To address the above two possible objections, a final ex-
periment was carried out. If the first objection is correct, then a
three-term task with real objects should be easier to solve than
one using computer presentation. If the second objection is
correct, then removing the need for tokens should also con-
tribute to higher performance on the three-term task having
physical objects.
Experiment 3 included one additional design alteration. It
was considered prudent to investigate the above prediction
across a wider range of children’s age. As well as allowing
direct comparison against the age groups in the Bryant and
Trabasso (1971) seminal paper, this provided a test of whether
physical-task versus computer-task differences might exist at
some ages, but not at others. Because of workingwith children
of younger ages than in Experiments 1 and 2 (e.g., 4–7-year-
olds; Bryant, 1998), it was necessary to use fewer trials than in
the earlier experiments. Thus, here, a greater number of chil-
dren were tested to compensate.
Method for Experiment 3
Participants
A total of 227 children between 4.26 and 7.29 years took part
(M = 5.75 years, SD = 0.788). Children were typically devel-
oping, with English as their first/only language. They were
allocated either to a three-term towers task or a three-term race
task (see below for task descriptions). A total of 111 children,
4.26 to 7.23 years of age, were assigned to the race task (M =
5.76 years, SD = 0.723). These were divided into three groups:
37 children, 4–5 years of age (M = 4.96 years, SD = 0.276); 40
children, 5–6 years of age (M = 5.77 years, SD = 0.276); and
34 children, 6–7 years of age (M = 6.62 years, SD = 0.301).
The towers task included 116 children, 4.33–7.29 years of age
(M = 5.75 years, SD = 0.848). A total of 41 children, 4–5 years
of age (M = 4.83 years, SD = 0.274); 38 children, 5–6 years of
age (M = 5.76 years, SD = 0.251); and 37 children, 6–7 years
of age (M = 6.77 years, SD = 0.341).
Materials
The towers task used three different sets of small, three-
dimensional wooden objects, each set selecting items from a
total of five available colours (red, green, blue, yellow, and
grey). Two objects of each colour were contained in a box so
that they were out of view of the child (as used in Wright &
Dowker, 2002). The second object shape was a cylinder with a
diameter of 5 cm and a height of 5.5 cm. The third objects
were cuboids with a square cross-section (5 cm) and a height
of 6 cm. The colours and numbers of objects for cuboids and
cylinders were the same as for the cubes described above.
Table 3 Summary of regression models for two tasks in Experiment 2
3 term 5 term
Step 1 Model R/ R2 0.448/0.201 0.487/0.237
F statistic 18.871 (<0. 001) 21.484 (<0.001)
Beta Coefficients
CD 0.448 (<0.001) 0.487 (<0.001)
Step 2 Model R/ R2 0.517/0.267
F statistic 6.661 (0.012)
Beta coefficients
CD 0.409 (<0.001)
Ages 0.260 (0.012)
Excluded variables
Ages −0.161 (0.145)
BC 0.067 (0.504) 0.189 (0.184)
Predict_i 0.069 (0.619) 0.116 (0.311)
Prem_Diff 0.093 (0.504) 0.344 (0.184)
Note. Figures in parentheses are levels of statistical significance. Predict_i
= use product of BC & CD to predict BD; Prem_Diff = compute differ-
ence between BC & CD
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Following Markovits, Dumas, and Malfait (1995), we also
employed a white filler block, which was a 5-cm/side cube.
The race task was presented on a portable computer as in
Experiments 1 and 2. This presented three cartoon children
getting ready to run against each other in pairs. The children
were of the same primary colours as in the towers task.
Design
A two factorial between-subjects design was used. Children
completed one of the two tasks (towers task vs. race task),
with the tasks representing one level of the first factor. The
second factor was age group, with 4–5-year-olds, 5–6-year-
olds, or 6–7-year-olds.
Procedure
Children were given one of the two task types. For the towers
task, each child was shown a practice/familiarization trial with
no filler block. Here, the child watched as the experimenter
placed a block (B) on top of a second block (C) to form a
tower of two blocks (BC). Next, a second tower containing
block C above D was constructed in the same way. The ex-
perimenter told the child, “Now, I can take one of those
(pointing to Block B at the top of its tower) and one of those
(pointing to Block D at the bottom of its tower) and make a
new tower with these two blocks. Watch me do that now.”
The experimenter reached into the box of objects and retrieved
a duplicate Block B and a duplicate Block D. Placing these
blocks apart on the table just in front of the child, the exper-
imenter asked, “If I look at this tower (BC) and I look at this
other tower (CD) as well, do you think I should put this block
(pointing to duplicate Block B) or this one (pointing to dupli-
cate Block D) on the top of my new tower? What do you
think?”After the child gave his or her answer, the experiment-
er constructed the new tower with Block B on top of Block D.
Although this practice trial seems transitive (Pears &
Bryant, 1990), Markovits et al. (1995) observed it contains a
positional cue that means the child does not have to apply
deduction to get the right answer. The child can merely ob-
serve that Block B is on top of tower BC and Block D was on
the bottom of the CD tower. If the child simply repeated this
positioning statement for B and D when given a duplicate
Block B and a duplicate Block D, he or she would arrive at
the correct response, but this strategy did not entail the use of
deduction. Markovits et al. therefore recommended that a fill-
er block be placed under the CD tower, so that this nondeduc-
tive cue is neutralized. After completing the first practice trial,
the child was introduced to the role of the filler block under
tower CD, via one further practice trial. Here, the experiment-
er removed all the blocks and then placed only the white filler
block on the table. The towers were then constructed as be-
fore, with the only difference being that the second (CD)
tower is constructed on top of the filler block. The child was
now introduced to the duplicate B and D blocks as before, and
after the child gave his or her answer, the experimenter built
the BD tower as before (note B and D now do not offer a
height cue).
Thus, the child first gave his or her response and then
witnessed the BD tower being built. However, the experi-
menter did not verbally give the child feedback as to whether
the child’s response was correct or incorrect. Instead, the ex-
perimenter merely constructed the BD tower correctly. The
child’s responses to the two practice trials were not recorded.
These practice trials constituted “warm-up problems” rather
than training (for first use of such trials, see Hooper, Toniolo,
& Sipple, 1978).
After the two practice trials, the child completed three prop-
er trials. In each trial, two towers representing premises BC
and CD were set up about 20 cm apart on the table, and about
30 cm in front of the child. For at least one trial, BC was to the
left of CD, and for the remainder of trials it was on the right
(Wright & Dowker, 2002). Two duplicate blocks, one of col-
ours B and D, respectively, were then placed between the two
towers, but closer to the child—around 15 cm from the child.
One departure from the practice trials was that for proper
trials the child was asked to make the third tower with the two
duplicate blocks (B & D) that had been placed loose on the
table in front of him or her. As the child reached forward to the
blocks, the experimenter said, “Remember, first you need to
tell me which one should go on top, and then you can make
the tower to show me. Is that ok?” The child gave his or her
response to the transitive question and then built the BD or DB
tower.
One of these three trials used the cubes as items, one used
cuboids and one used cylinders. The trials were given in ran-
dom order across children and each trial used a different com-
bination of colours, such that the B block was never the same
colour in more than one of the three trials.
For the race task, children viewed short cartoons containing
dynamically-life-like but slowed down movements of cartoon
characters. These were presented on computer in full-screen
mode, and were set within a three-dimensional scene
displayed on the screen (Markovits & Thompson, 2008). In
a practice/familiarization trial, the child watched as three boys
lined up to run against each other. They were each dressed in
different-coloured clothes—red, blue and green. As they ran
to the finish, one boy came in first (e.g., B = red), with a
different boy coming second (e.g., C = blue), and the final
boy coming third (e.g., D = green). The motion sequence took
around 10 seconds. The child was then shown the boys run-
ning again, with the same outcome.
Three proper trials followed. In one of these, the child
watched as two girls stood on the start line. One was dressed
in one colour (e.g., B = blue), and the other was dressed in a
different colour (e.g., C = red). The child was told, “These two
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are going to run a race.” After the race, the child was then
asked, “So, which one won?” After the child gave an answer,
two characters again appeared at the start line, one of which
was the same colour as one of the first two runners (e.g., C =
red) and the other dressed in a new colour (e.g., D = green).
One of these (e.g., red) crossed the finish line first.
After observing these two races, the child was shown B and
D at the start line and was told that these two (e.g., blue &
green) were about to run. The child was asked, “Who is going
to win out of these two?” As with the towers task above, no
verbal feedback was given for the transitive question on prop-
er trials. Two further trials were given in random order, one
with girls and one with boys.
Both the towers task and the race task took around 10
minutes to complete, including briefing, debriefing, instruc-
tions, and the two practice trials. Children were thanked for
their participation and were returned to their classroom. For
both the height task and the racing task, a child was given a
mark of 1 if the answer on a trial had been correct, and 0 if
incorrect. The cumulative score was taken as an estimate of
transitive reasoning capacity.
Results and discussion for Experiment 3
The maximum possible transitive (BD) score was 3.
Performance according to task and age group is summarized
in Table 4. The tendencies were assessed using a two-way
between-subjects ANOVA, having age (three levels) and task
(two levels) as factors.
For both the three-term tasks of Experiment 3, the BD
inference, overall, did not tend to differ. This was supported
by amain effect of task, which was statistically nonsignificant,
F(1, 221) < 1. However, the tendency towards higher transi-
tive performance with age group was statistically significant,
F(2, 221) = 6.470, p = .002. These two main effects taken
together suggest that both these tasks were sensitive to age,
but there was no advantage of the physical task (the towers
task) over the computer-based task (the race task).
Post hoc comparisons using Scheffe’s test for multiple
comparisons showed the improvement from 4–5 years to 5–
6 years was not statistically significant (p = .183, one-tailed).
However, the improvement from 5–6 years to 6–7 years bor-
dered on statistical significance (p = .053, one-tailed), and the
improvement from the youngest to the oldest age group was
also significant (p < .001).
Consideration of the two-way interaction between task and
age group would reveal whether, despite there being no over-
all difference between the two tasks, there was a tendency for
one task to lead to higher performance relative to the other
task, but this tendency tended to reverse as we move from the
youngest group to the oldest group. Any such tendency, how-
ever, was nonsignificant, F(2, 221) < 1. This shows that nei-
ther task led to reliably higher performance for any of the three
age groups. Finally, the performance of the oldest age group
here was around 6% below three-term performance in
Experiment 1, a tendency that is in line with the oldest group
here being around 1 year younger than in Experiment 1.
General discussion
The present findings suggest, possibly for the first time within
a single empirical paper, that three-term tasks but also
extensive-training tasks can validly index transitive
responding. Indeed, I found several similarities between per-
formance profiles for these two tasks as well as some intrigu-
ing differences. These are outlined below, along with consid-
eration of what they tell us about transitive development dur-
ing childhood.
First, efforts were made to ensure that a three-term
nontraining task and a five-term extensive-training task were
as equivalent as reasonably possible. This was achieved by
using four randomized trials versus four randomized training
sessions, respectively. Although premise retention on the
three-term task of Experiment 1 was errorless immediately
before children gave their answer to the transitive question,
mean premise recall dropped to 85% immediately upon giving
the transitive response. This implies that, in addition to pre-
mise memory affecting ability to make a transitive inference,
the giving of a transitive response may also affect ability to
retain the premises.
The premises in the five-term task were much harder to
acquire than those of the three-term task. This is in line with
findings fromWright (2006a/b), who estimated that adult per-
formance when learning the 10 premises on a five-term task
imposes a similar memory load as children learning only three
responses on a three-term task. That said, in line with Bryant
(1998), inferences were more difficult to deduce than the in-
formation they were based on in the three-term task of
Experiment 1 and the five-term task of Experiment 2 (Bara
et al., 2010; Markovits & Dumas, 1999; Wright & Howells,
2008; Wright & Smailes, 2015). Intriguingly, the only excep-
tion to this profile was the five-term task of Experiment 1,
which was the task employing the test procedure closest to
Bryant and Trabasso (1971).
The superiority of premise memory over the critical BD
inference was more evident in the three-term task (contrast
Breslow, 1981). Indeed, there has long been some
intraparadigm disagreement regarding extensive-training task
advocates (e.g., contrast Trabasso, 1977, with Bryant &
Trabasso, 1971). For instance, in the Bryant and Trabasso
(1971) study, the premise superiority profile is noted; but in
Trabasso’s (1977) subsequent research, and many other
extensive-training tasks since Trabasso, it is often reported
that the inferential response is now higher than the premises
on which that inference is supposed to be based (Favrel &
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Barrouillet, 2000; Titone et al., 2004). Trabasso himself noted
the obvious answer is that when one finds an inference supe-
riority profile (part of what he called the symbolic distance
effect), one should suspect that the transitive response had not
been based on deducing anything from the premises at the
time of test (Trabasso, 1977; Wright & Howells, 2008). This
was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in Wright (2006a),
where it was found that the deductive profile did emerge dur-
ing moderate training, but by the last session of testing, it had
been replaced by Trabasso’s profile. The profiles across the
present experiments therefore indicate that in the extensive-
training task of Experiment 2, the training regime led to some
degree of deduction (Trabasso et al., 1989), whereas the train-
ing regime used in Experiment 1 led to a nondeductive strat-
egy for arriving at the BD inference (Trabasso, 1977).
Halving the number of rounds of learning and testing on a
five-term task, whilst keeping the overall task duration con-
stant, did lead to an 11% improvement in the BD inference, in
relative terms. But in learning-disabled children and very
young typically developing children, one can also increase
transitive responding by greatly extending training instead of
titrating it, regardless of whether the participants are thought
to possess deductive transitive inference (Holcomb et al.,
1997; Renner, Price, & Subiaul, 2016; Stromer et al., 1993).
These apparently contradictory findings represent an opportu-
nity for those seeking ways of addressing learning difficulty.
Notwithstanding this possibility, highly extensive training
and memory still represent a potential issue with extensive-
training tasks (Wright, 2012). Indeed, whether such tasks are
even feasible within the context of children in schools today is
questionable (Artman & Cahan, 1999; Castle & Needham,
2007; Rabinowitz et al., 1994). Perhaps this realization is
why there seems no empirical paper based around the
extensive-training task by Bryant’s lab, since the Bryant and
Trabasso (1971) paper more than 4 decades ago. I suggest the
extensive-training task can be of continued value in develop-
mental reasoning research. However, future studies may need
to reduce the rounds of extensive-training and testing if they
wish to improve memory performance. In the present case,
doing so in Experiment 2 led to premise learning some 14%
better relative to the extensive-training task of Experiment 1,
even though Experiment 2 did not increase overall task
duration.
On the issue of rapid training, the administration of a five-
term extensive-training task in less than 30minutes is possibly
the most rapidly such a task has yet been given to children
(e.g., contrast Berens & Hayes, 2007; Holcomb et al., 1997;
Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Van der
Lely, 1997). But over and above rapidity, adopting a modified
five-term task could leave researchers with sufficient time
available to permit testing of young children in other domains
of reasoning or social/interpersonal functioning (e.g., atten-
tional performance, working memory, mathematical compe-
tencies, language competencies, understanding other people’s
minds, attitudes regarding out groups; Birenbaum &
Gutierrez, 2007; Coleman et al., 2010; Ragni & Knauff,
2013; Sedek, Piber-Dabrowska, Maio, & Von Hecker, 2011;
Von Bastian & Oberauer, 2014). This was the original prom-
ise of transitive research (Binet & Simon, 1916), and it might
now be realized.
Categorical effects might be an issue for extensive-training
tasks. This is because one item always receives the most un-
marked response or consistently positive response (e.g., is
always taller in every comparison), whereas another item al-
ways receives the most marked or most consistently negative
response (e.g., shorter in every comparison; Wright &
Smailes, 2015). In their paper, which arguably ignited transi-
tive research as it is conceived today, Bryant and Trabasso
(1971) had advised that this issue is readily circumvented by
avoiding the use of the end items (e.g., Items A and E in a five-
term series). I would agree with this assertion. However, if one
is not necessarily targeting a deductive transitive competence,
there may be much to gain by investigating the nature of the
mental representation of the entire series in memory itself, and
how subsequent inferential responses are generated from it
(Brunamonti et al., 2017; Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013; Qu
et al., 2017; Trabasso, 1977; Van der Lely, 1997; Wright,
2006a; Wright & Howells, 2008).
Even when Experiment 2 ensured that there was much
greater variability in age in the new five-term task, inferential
performance still did not correlate with age, and age did not
feature in its associated regression model (Castle & Needham,
Table 4 Transitive performance for the towers task and race task of Experiment 3
4–5-year-olds 5–6-year-olds 6–7-year-olds All children
Race task 1.432 (0.167)
48%
1.800 (0.161)
60%
2.056 (0.174)
69%
1.764 (0.097)
59%
Towers task 1.585 (0.159)
53%
1.684 (0.165)
56%
2.135 (0.167)
71%
1.802 (0.094)
60%
Overall tasks 1.509 (0.115)
50%
1.742 (0.115)
58%
2.097 (0.121)
70%
1.783 (0.068)
59%
Note. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of mean scores. Percentages are included for ease of comparison with other research
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2007). By contrast, for all the three-term tasks used across
these experiments, increases in age or in age group were as-
sociated with increases in inferential performance. Indeed,
there was little age variability in the three-term task analyzed
as part of Experiment 2, yet age not only correlated with
inferential performance, it also was retained alongside CD
performance in the corresponding regression model (Wright,
2006b).
Thus, three-term tasks appear to relate to maturation with
age as found in all experiments here, whereas five-term tasks
that use extensive-training relate more to the amount of train-
ing given than to age (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Chapman &
Lindenberger, 1992; Wright & Smailes, 2015; Wright et al.,
2011). This account would explain the finding that, when the
three-term task and five-term task were analyzed together in
Experiment 1, age was not a significant covariate of inferential
performance. This also occurred when the three-term task and
the new five-term task in Experiment 2 were analyzed using
ANCOVA. The explanation is that the lack of association to
age on the five-term tasks had introduced enough random
variability to reduce the overall reliability of the covariation,
when age was a covariate across the three-term and five-term
tasks analyzed together in Experiment 2.
Crucially, cognitive development is said generally to in-
crease as age increases (Chapman & Lindenberger, 1992).
Thus, if one seeks a task that will distinguish the kind of
cognitive competencies that are thought to develop or mature
with age, one would do better to include three-term
nontraining tasks than to rely only on extensive training.
Considering the present findings, for the three-term task the
two premises were retained quite independently of one anoth-
er (i.e., BC did not reliably correlate with CD). However,
despite this, levels of transitive reasoning were higher than
for the extensive-training task regardless of amount of training
given in Experiments 1 and 2. This is evidence that it is not
necessary to integrate premises into a single linear array in
order to achieve veridical transitive inferences (contrast
Breslow, 1981; Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013).
On the other hand, for the five-term task, the two premises
were now highly correlated. The fact that the correlation was
negative implies that children remembering one premise
tended to forget the other premise. It is as though they extract-
ed one item of a premise (either B or D) and then used its
position in the series, as an anchor from which the BD infer-
ence could be determined without an inferential strategy. For
example, applying the gist that “every item to the left of D is
larger” (referring to A, B, & C, respectively, but excluding
Item E; Gazes et al., 2014; Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Wright,
2001). Thus, as B would be to the left of D, assuming the child
was mentally constructing the series from left to right in de-
creasing size, Bmust be the longer one: A response that would
be correct even though it did not involve coordination of BC
with CD in order to “deduce” BD (Breslow, 1981; Trabasso,
1977; Wright, 2012). Brainerd and Reyna (1992) observed
that once the gist is generated, memory for the verbatim pre-
mises begins to fade. The present memory findings for the
five-term task suggests that at least one premise is retained
to enable the pivot to be constructed (Wright, 2012).
In the correlational analyses, both premises associated pos-
itively to the BD inference for the three-term task, but for the
five-term task the major BC premise was negatively associat-
ed with BD. Thus, the major premise seems to feature in a
different (opposite) way in the extensive-training task com-
pared with the nontraining task. The minor CD premise and
not the major BC premise featured both in the regression anal-
ysis for the three-term task and also for the five-term task
(Wright & Smailes, 2015; Wright et al., 2011). Additionally,
in the regressions, the BC premise did not positively relate to
the BD inference, either for the three-term or the five-term task
in Experiment 2. This poses difficulty for the view that the
transitive series is always constructed from the large
(unmarked) end (MacLean et al., 2008; Qu et al., 2017). The
conclusion that it is the minor premise that pivots the series in
memory is in line with data tables in several studies (Favrel &
Barrouillet, 2000; Frank, Ruby, Levy, & O’Reilly, 2005;
Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010; Wright, 2006a). It is also sup-
ported by data from nonhumans (Gazes et al., 2014; Treichler
& Raghanti, 2010).
For the three-term task as well as the five-term tasks in
Experiment 2, both the product of the premises and also the
difference between the premises were correlated to the BD
inference, even though in the three-term task the premises
did not reliably correlate with each other. This supports the
view that memory in some sense relates to inferential reason-
ing, at least during relatively limited premise acquisition
(Chapman & Lindenberger, 1992; Gazes et al., 2014;
Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013). However, Brainerd and Reyna’s
(1992) findings of memory independence are not necessarily
disputed. This is because, on extensive-training tasks, memo-
ry dependence can appear during premise acquisition, with
memory independence replacing it if premise memory ap-
proaches asymptote (Wright, 2006a).
Perhaps computer tasks are more demanding than tasks
using real objects. This could explain all the differences in
profiles reported for the tasks of Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3 tested this prediction for three-term tasks.
Here, no differences in BD performance was found, even
though the two tasks used different transitive relations. One
arrives at the same conclusion if previously published three-
term tasks that did versus did not use computer presentations
are considered (e.g., compare Ameel et al., 2007; Rabinowitz
et al., 1994; with Kallio, 1988; Wright & Dowker, 2002). The
objection is also ruled out for five-term tasks (e.g., compare
Holcomb et al., 1997; Stromer et al., 1993; with Bryant &
Trabasso, 1971; Riley & Trabasso, 1974). Therefore, the dif-
ferences reported above for three-term versus five-term tasks
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were unlikely due to the use of real objects versus computer
presentations.
Taking together, the contrasting findings, such as on pre-
mise correlation, on associations with age, and on the sign-
reversal associated with the correlation between the major
(BC) premise and the BD transitive inference, it would appear
the two tasks tended to index two somewhat distinct ways of
arriving at transitive responses (Brunamonti et al., 2017;
Trabasso et al., 1989). Dual-process theory is based around
two processes, sometimes labelled Type 1, or associative, ver-
sus Type 2, or analytic processing (Ameel et al., 2007;
Barrouillet, 2011; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013; Klaczynski, 2001; Wright, 2012). Type 1
processes tend to be relatively fast, are largely unconscious,
and are species general (Greene, Spellman, Dusek,
Eichenbaum, & Levy, 2001; Ricco & Overton, 2011;
Wright 2006a). Classical theories (e.g., Wynne, 1995) span-
ning transitive reasoning in humans and animals in terms of
reinforcements or value transfer from one item of a premise
pair (e.g., Item A) through to all other items in the transitive
series (e.g., Item E), can be readily accommodated within this
functional system. Type 2 processes tend to call on WM, are
slower, require or result in conscious awareness, and in
nonhumans these have been intimated for only a few species
thus far (Kumaran & Ludwig, 2013; Libben & Titone, 2008;
Premack, 2007).
However, just as systems in dual-process theory are now
considered distinct but complementary (Evans & Stanovich,
2013), it is time to begin taking the transitive competencies
indexed by the extensive-training and the three-term tasks as
systems complementing one another rather than as mutually
exclusive rivals (Frank et al., 2005; Gazes et al., 2014;Wright,
2012). Theorists can then ask new questions, such as about
whether the associative mode of transitive reasoning is what
gives rise to the deductive mode much later on in child devel-
opment. Indeed, turning more attention to how these tasks can
be used together in order to further enrich the understanding of
transitive responding, plus how this relates to other aspects of
social-cognition, should always have been considered the
main pursuit in transitive research (Amd & Roche, 2016;
Artman & Cahan, 1999; Castle & Needham, 2007; De Neys
& Vanderputte, 2011; Gazes et al., 2014; Morsanyi et al.,
2013; Renner et al., 2016; von Bastian & Oberauer, 2014;
Wright et al., 2011).
Take learning difficulties as a case in point (Lutkus &
Trabasso, 1974). Teaching techniques based on contrasts be-
tween the two types of transitive tasks can potentially help an
individual follow spoken discourse embodying inferable rela-
tionships, be better able to navigate social spaces via linking
together different approaches to a layout such as a town cen-
tre, be better able to make good comparisons between differ-
ent items when shopping, or even better able to avoid unduly
negative social comparisons between one’s self and peers
(Favrel & Barrouillet, 2000; Long & Kamii, 2001; Maydak,
Stromer, Mackay, & Stoddard, 1995; Rosales & Rehfeldt,
2007; Trabasso et al., 1989). This pursuit embodies the orig-
inal promise of transitive research (Binet & Simon, 1916), and
we are now in a better position to deliver on it to the benefit of
child and learning-disabled groups than ever before.
Conclusions
In the first direct comparison of three-term nontraining versus
five-term extensive-training tasks, five-term tasks were more
difficult, rather than easier to solve, as has previously been
assumed. However, they became easier when highly repeated
presentations of premises were given. This confirmed that
training on extensive-training tasks can indeed be considered
rapid if one uses double the premise exposures before the
inferences are tested, instead of checking learning after every
premise is presented.
Memory, in some sense, relates to inferential responses, in
so far as both the product of performance on the antecedent
premises and the performance difference between these pre-
mises correlate to the proportion of correct inferences.
Additionally, in contrast to what has been generally assumed
to date, it seems it is the minor (CD) premise that plays the
more pivotal role in reaching the inference, with this the case
regardless of whether one considers the extensive-training
task or the three-term task.
Concerning task differences, three-term tasks were sensi-
tive to age, regardless of whether children in a narrow age
band or in a wider age band were tested. Also, the similar
performance levels in the three-term tasks (using length,
towers, and racing, respectively) are in line with the view that
three-term tasks can index a unitary underlying transitive
competence. By contrast, the two extensive-training tasks
seemed insensitive to age whether I worked with a narrow
or a much wider age range—and they seemed to index some-
what different competencies.
Another difference was that the premises logically neces-
sary for deriving the transitive inference were correlated with
each other on the extensive-training task, but not on the three-
term task. Also, there was a tendency for the major premise
(BC) to relate to the BD inference via a positive correlation for
the three-term task, but via a negative correlation for the
extensive-training task.
These findings are consistent with a dual-process account
of transitive reasoning. Under such a conception, extensive-
training tasks readily access Type 1 processes (i.e., gradually
emerging associative linkages). This does not mean that these
tasks never index the target deductive competence—further
research is required to answer that question. Nontraining tasks
more readily access Type 2 processes (i.e., willful mental sim-
ulations leading to premise coordination—deduction). If one
accepts such a dual-process account for transitive reasoning,
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previously unsettled issues such as an extensive-training ver-
sus nontraining paradigm yielding differing estimates on age
of acquisition, and on inferential difficulty, cease to be con-
tentious. This is because each task tends to be linked to its own
inferential system, with both systems essential for decision-
making in the real world.
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